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I find computers a bit mysterious, and I know
that many think that monetary policy is even
more mysterious. Federal Reserve officials used
to delight in adding to the mystery, but today
advances in macroeconomic theory have made
clear the importance of central bank transparency
to an effective monetary policy.
Since coming to the St. Louis Fed in 1998, I
have spoken often on the subject of the predict-
ability of Federal Reserve policy, emphasizing
that predictability enhances the effectiveness of
policy.1 Predictability has many dimensions, but
one is certainly that the market cannot predict
what the Fed is going to do without a deep under-
standing of what the Fed is trying to do.
The Fed has stated for many years that a key
monetary policy objective is low and stable
inflation. I believe that adding formality to that
objective can clarify what the Fed does and why.
That is my topic today.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments; Daniel L. Thornton, vice president in the
Research Division, provided special assistance.
I take full responsibility for errors.
THE FRAMEWORK
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
has the responsibility to determine monetary
policy. The Committee implements policy by
I
am delighted to speak with Junior
Achievement of Arkansas. I cannot report
a story about how Junior Achievement (JA)
got me off to a good start, but I do have a
personal story—from my oldest son, Will. When
I accepted this speaking invitation, I asked Will
to reflect on his JA experience, and here is the
paragraph he sent me.
I was involved in Junior Achievement when I
was in 8th grade. Most entrepreneurial-minded
kids I knew gained their business experiences
on paper routes, painting houses or the like.
But I was drawn to JA’s concept of teaching the
basics of business and figuring out how to
mass-produce something. Little did I know
where it would lead me. In my JA group, we
assembled wooden coat pegs on boards and
painted them up nicely. I quickly learned that
building a single coat-rack widget is not so
hard, but leading a handful of people to make
50, with quality, is much harder. And that get-
ting all of them sold for a profit is even harder
yet. I can’t say exactly which of the skills I
learned at JA helped me end up running the
Windows business at Microsoft. I was a big
dreamer back then, but even I would not have
dreamt that I would someday be leading a team
of 3,000 professionals that create software that
is used in 169 countries around the world and
powers 200,000,000 new PCs sold every year.
JA, thanks for the jump-start!
Will is a senior vice president for Microsoft’s
Windows client business. Needless to say, I am
immensely proud of him. I don’t know the list,
but will bet that numerous other JA alumni are
in very responsible positions today.
1 See Poole (1999) for the first of a series of speeches on this topic.setting a target for the federal funds rate. Policy
predictability does not mean that the public or
the markets can successfully forecast the target
federal funds rate next week, next month, or next
year. The target rate is based on policymakers’
current information and best estimate of future
economic events; the key observation is that
incoming information may depart from the best
estimate and indicate that the target funds rate
needs to be changed to achieve policy objectives.
What we must mean by perfectly predictable is
that the public and the markets are not surprised
by the Fed’s response to the latest economic
information, understanding that the information
itself is not predictable.
Although new information creates a steady
stream of mostly minor surprises, the FOMC ought
to be clear about what it is trying to accomplish.
At present, most members of the Committee
would probably be pretty close together on how
to state the inflation goal. A benefit of greater
formality in defining the inflation goal is that
individual FOMC members would have a clearer
idea as to what the inflation objective is.
To illustrate this point, I have often said that
my preferred target rate of inflation is “zero,
properly measured.” That is, allowing as best we
can for measurement bias, which might be in the
neighborhood of half a percent per year for broad
measures of consumer prices, I favor literally zero
inflation. Given measurement bias in price
indices, I might state my goal as inflation between
0.5 and 1.5 percent as measured by the price index
for personal consumption expenditures (the PCE
price index). Others prefer a somewhat higher
rate of inflation, perhaps in the range of 1 to 2
percent as measured by the PCE price index. Still
others might favor a different target range, with a
different midpoint and/or a wider or narrower
range. If the FOMC decides to discuss inflation
targeting, all dimensions of specifying a target
will be considered carefully.
Why does precision on a target range matter?
Consider a situation in which the actual rate of
inflation is 1.5 percent. Those favoring a target
range of 1 to 2 percent would say that the policy
stance is just right; inflation is in the exact center
of the target range. I, given my preferred target
range, would argue for a somewhat more restric-
tive stance, to move the inflation rate down toward
the center of my preferred range. The difference
between these two target ranges is small, and yet
that difference might be enough to call for a some-
what different policy stance.
Obviously, the Fed cannot simultaneously
pursue two different inflation goals, and therefore
there is every reason for the Committee to agree
on a common objective. An agreed-upon common
objective is much more important than the small
difference between my own preferred objective
and the range of objectives I believe are favored
by others.
If the FOMC were to decide on a common
objective, then the Committee could communicate
it to the general public. Discussion of the formal,
numeric objective and what it means would help
markets to better understand monetary policy and
would make policy more predictable. However,
many details matter and an inflation target will
not be a source of increased clarity unless the
details are specified appropriately. So, let’s talk
about those important details. To simplify the
language, I’ll refer to a publicly announced, spe-
cific numerical target range for inflation as a
“formal” inflation target or objective.
WHAT IS INFLATION?
If the FOMC is going to adopt a formal inflation
objective, we need to agree on what “inflation” is.
However inflation is measured, it is important to
distinguish between “high frequency” inflation,
which central banks have little control over, and
“low frequency” inflation, which central banks
can control. High-frequency inflation is the rate
of change in the price level over relatively short
time periods—months, quarters, or perhaps even
a year. Low-frequency inflation is an economy-
wide, systemic process that is affected by past,
present, and expected future economic events.
Central banks accept responsibility for low-
frequency inflation because such inflation
depends critically on past and, especially,
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that the Fed establish a formal inflation objective,
I am speaking of the low-frequency inflation rate.
As a practical matter, low-frequency inflation can
be thought of as the average inflation rate over a
period of a few years.
SETTING THE TARGET RATE OF
INFLATION
The Employment Act of 1946 sets objectives
for monetary policy—indeed, objectives for all
economic policy.2 The Act declares that it is the
“responsibility of the Federal Government...to
promote maximum employment, production, and
purchasing power.” These objectives are reflected
in the FOMC’s twin objectives of “price stability”
and “maximum sustainable economic growth.”
Although useful, these phrases are somewhat
vague. For example, in the late 1970s and early
1980s, the Fed pursued the goal of price stability
by reducing inflation from double-digit rates; from
the mid-1980s into the early 1990s, the goal was
to bring inflation down from the 4 percent neigh-
borhood. Over the past decade or so, the goal has
come to mean keeping the inflation rate low.
But what inflation rate constitutes price sta-
bility? Rather than a numerical definition, former
Chairman Greenspan preferred a conceptual
definition, suggesting that “price stability is best
thought of as an environment in which inflation
is so low and stable over time that it does not
materially enter into the decisions of households
and firms.”3 But does Greenspan’s definition
require zero inflation?
Because measuring the price level is a daunting
task, zero true inflation and zero measured infla-
tion may differ. Prices of individual goods and
services change over time, but if some prices are
falling and others are rising, then the average of
all prices, or the price level, can remain constant.
Nevertheless, defining a price index when prices
are changing at different rates involves measure-
ment issues that are complicated at both concep-
tual and practical levels. For a variety of technical
reasons that I won’t discuss, the best we can do
is to approximate the theoretical construct of the
price level. Experts believe that price indices, such
as the consumer price index (CPI) and the PCE
price index, have an upward bias. That is, if the
price level were truly unchanged, the price index
would show a low rate of inflation.
When asked during the July 1996 FOMC meet-
ing what level of inflation does not cause distor-
tions to economic decisionmaking, Chairman
Greenspan responded, “zero, if inflation is prop-
erly measured.”4 Greenspan’s view that the theo-
retically correct definition of price stability is zero
inflation stems from his belief that economic
growth is maximized when the price level is
unchanged on average over time.5 While I believe
that there is a virtual consensus that the economy
functions best when the theoretically correct meas-
ure of inflation is “low,” not everyone agrees with
Greenspan that true price stability—a zero rate
of inflation properly measured—is the best target
for the Fed. For a variety of reasons, some econo-
mists believe that the economy functions best
when inflation correctly measured is “low” but
not zero.
While the goal of price stability is specific in
both the Federal Reserve Act and the Employment
Act of 1946, some suggest that the FOMC lacks
the authority to establish a numerical inflation
objective. They claim that only Congress has this
authority. That Congress has the power to estab-
lish the goals of economic policy is indisputable;
however, it does not follow that the FOMC does
not have the authority to adopt a formal inflation
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2 See Santoni (1986) for a discussion of the creation of the Act.
3 Greenspan (2002, p. 6).
4 Transcript of the FOMC meeting held on July 2-3, 1996, p. 51.
5 For completeness, I note that Friedman (1969) argued that the optimal rate of inflation was negative. Specifically, he suggested that economic
welfare was maximized when the nominal interest rate was zero. This requires that the inflation rate is equal to negative of the real interest rate.objective as part of implementing its broad con-
gressional mandate. It is common practice for
Congress to establish objectives and guidelines
and leave it up to the agency responsible for
meeting those objectives to fill in the details.
The real question is this: Should the FOMC
announce what its inflation objective is? Answer-
ing this question is simple in principle. If announc-
ing a specific, numerical inflation objective
enhances the efficacy of monetary policy, then the
answer is yes. If doing so reduces the efficacy of
monetary policy, the answer is no. I believe the
answer is yes for a variety of reasons.
THE CASE FOR AN INFLATION
TARGET
I have already pointed out that a formal
inflation goal should improve the coherence of
internal Fed deliberations by focusing attention
on how to achieve an agreed goal rather than on
the goal itself. Adopting and achieving a formal
inflation objective should reduce risks for indi-
viduals and businesses when making long-term
decisions.
Because the benefits of price stability are
indirect and diffuse, they are difficult to quantify.
One area where the benefits of price stability are
most apparent is the long-term bond market. It is
not surprising that the 10-year Treasury bond
yield has generally drifted down with actual and
expected inflation since the late 1970s. The reduc-
tion in long-term bond yields reflects market
participants’ expectations of lower inflation and
their increased confidence about the long-term
inflation rate. Moreover, the volatility of the mar-
ket’s expected rate of inflation, measured by the
spread between nominal and inflation-indexed
10-year Treasury bond yields, has trended down
since the late 1990s, suggesting an increased
confidence in the Fed’s resolve to keep inflation
low. I anticipate that the adoption of a formal
inflation objective would result in some, probably
modest, further reduction in the level and vari-
ability of nominal long-term bond yields.
Adopting a formal inflation objective, and
success in achieving that objective, will also
enhance policymakers’ ability to pursue other
policy objectives, such as conducting counter-
cyclical monetary policy. I suspect that some of
those who oppose a specific inflation objective are
concerned that doing so will cause policymakers
to become what Mervyn King, Governor of the
Bank of England, has colorfully termed “inflation
nutters.” King (1997) is referring to policymakers
who aim to stabilize inflation, whatever the costs.
I believe that just the opposite has happened.
The debate is fundamentally about the rela-
tionship between the low-inflation objective and
the high-employment objective. Even before
British economist A.W. Phillips published
research in 1958 that gave rise to what quickly
came to be called the Phillips curve, many econ-
omists believed that there was a negative relation-
ship between inflation and unemployment—i.e.,
lower inflation resulted in higher unemployment.
Some preferred to think of causation as going the
other way around—that higher unemployment
resulted in lower inflation.
The inflation-unemployment trade-off was
thought to be permanent. Society could have a
permanently lower average unemployment rate
by accepting a higher average rate of inflation. In
the late 1960s, Milton Friedman (1968) and
Edmund Phelps (1967) challenged the idea of a
permanent trade-off by making the theoretical
argument that the Phillips curve must be vertical
in the long run in a world where economic agents
are rational. Subsequent evidence confirmed the
Friedman-Phelps view, and few economists today
believe that there is any long-run trade-off.
A vertical long-run Phillips curve does not
imply that one long-run inflation rate is as good as
any other. Rather, the dynamics of the Friedman-
Phelps theory imply that inflation would accel-
erate continuously were policymakers to pursue
a policy of keeping the unemployment rate per-
manently below its natural, or equilibrium, rate.
This equilibrium rate came to be called the
NAIRU—the nonaccelerating inflation rate of
unemployment.
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why a policy of keeping the unemployment rate
permanently below its natural rate is futile. It does
not tell us the inflation rate that maximizes social
welfare, which I will call the optimal inflation
rate. Economic theory demonstrates why inflation
is costly, and worldwide experience demonstrates
that “high” inflation and “slow” economic growth
appear to be inexorably linked. Everyone acknowl-
edges that, beyond some rate, inflation reduces
economic growth. The goals of price stability and
maximum sustainable economic growth are not
substitutes, as implied by the original Phillips
curve, but complements. Monetary policymakers
can make their greatest contribution to achieving
maximum sustainable economic growth by achiev-
ing and maintaining low and stable inflation.
That inflation and economic growth are
complements does not imply that policymakers
should not engage in countercyclical monetary
policy when circumstances warrant. For example,
with inflation well contained at the end of the
long 1990s expansion, the FOMC began reducing
its target for the federal funds rate in January 2001,
somewhat in advance of the onset of the 2001
recession. The funds rate target was reduced still
further in 2002 and 2003 as incoming data revealed
that the economy was responding somewhat more
slowly than expected and that actual and expected
inflation remained well contained. The funds rate
target was eventually reduced to 1 percent and
remained there for slightly more than a year.
Those who suggest that adopting a formal
inflation objective will cause policymakers to
become inflation nutters and, somehow, limit the
Fed’s ability to pursue other policy objectives
should examine actual experience. Not only did
the Fed’s commitment to price stability not prevent
it from engaging in countercyclical monetary
policy—it facilitated it.6 Such an aggressive coun-
tercyclical monetary policy as pursued starting
in early 2001 would have been unthinkable were
it not for the fact that the credibility established
over the years since Paul Volcker dramatically
altered the course of monetary policy in October
1979.7
I believe that having a formal inflation objec-
tive will further enhance the Fed’s credibility and,
consequently, its ability to engage in counter-
cyclical monetary policy. The reason is simple.
The more open and precise the Fed is about its
long-run inflation objective, the more confident
the public will be that the Fed will meet that
objective. The objective, and the accompanying
obligation to explain situations in which the
objective is not achieved, should increase the
Fed’s credibility.
Because it will be much easier for the public
to determine whether the FOMC is pursuing its
inflation objective if that objective is known with
precision, adopting a formal objective for infla-
tion also will enhance the Fed’s accountability.
Having a formal objective makes the Congress’s
and the public’s job easier, thereby enhancing
accountability. If the FOMC misses its inflation
objective, it will have to say why the objective
was missed. By the same token, the FOMC will
have to explain why it failed to respond to a par-
ticular event when inflation appeared to be well-
contained within the objective. In essence, having
a specific inflation objective will help the public
better understand what I have elsewhere called
“the Fed’s monetary policy rule.”8
SPECIFYING THE TARGET
That there are differences of opinion about
the optimal inflation rate is not a reason for having
a fuzzy objective. If there are important differences
of opinion within the FOMC on the appropriate
target, which I doubt, the Committee ought to
resolve those differences and not permit them to
be a source of uncertainty.
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6 For evidence on how inflation interfered with countercyclical policy in the past, see Poole (2002).
7 For those interested in understanding the issues that led up to and succeeded this event, see Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2005).
8 Poole (2006).Because the target should apply to low-
frequency inflation, the target needs to be stated
in terms of either a range or a point target with
an understood range of fluctuation around the
point target. The choice is more a matter of the
most effective way of communicating the target
and what it means than a matter of substance.
A specific target range, such as 1 to 2 percent
annual change in a particular price index, has the
advantage of focusing attention on low-frequency
inflation. Even here, there could be special circum-
stances, which the Fed should explain should
they occur, that would justify departure from the
target. The way the range is expressed interacts
with the period over which inflation is averaged.
A narrower range would be appropriate for a
target expressed as a three-year average than for
a year-over-year target.
To understand what such a target means,
suppose states were to abolish sales taxes and
raise income taxes to offset the revenue loss. The
effect of this change in tax structure would be to
reduce measured prices. Such a tax change would
be a one-time effect—the price level would change
when the new tax law took effect but there would
not be continuing pressure over time tending to
lower prices. Suppose the one-shot price level
change took measured inflation outside the target
range. With a formal inflation target, the FOMC
would have the responsibility of explaining why
a monetary policy response to this target miss
would be unnecessary and perhaps harmful.
A formal inflation target needs to refer to a
particular price index. That there is no price index
that adequately reflects the economy’s true rate
of inflation is yet another reason given for not
adopting a specific inflation objective. My own
judgment is that the PCE price index measures
consumer prices reasonably well and has some
advantages, which can be explained, over the CPI.
Moreover, the FOMC could reasonably maintain
a rate of increase in this index in a range of, say
1 to 2 percent, on a two-year moving average basis
under most circumstances.
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Figure 1A
CPI and Core CPI 3-Year Moving AveragesOver time, refinements in the price index or
introduction of better indices may lead to substi-
tution of another index for the PCE index or justify
a change in the target range. The FOMC would
then have to explain why it was adjusting the
objective or index used to evaluate the objective.
The formal target provides a valuable vehicle for
explaining an important issue in the conduct of
monetary policy. Experience with inflation target-
ing in industrial economies suggests that issues
of this sort have not been important. The markets
are already well informed about such issues—
and are becoming increasingly so. Conducting
this conversation with the markets will improve
the clarity of monetary policy and therefore its
effectiveness.
Over the past decade or so the Fed has gravi-
tated to the position of placing primary emphasis
on the core rate of inflation, as measured by the
PCE price index excluding food and energy. The
reason is not that food and energy are unimpor-
tant—these are obviously two very important
categories of goods. Rather, experience indicates
that food and energy prices are subject to large
short-run disturbances that are beyond the ability
of monetary policy to control without policy
responses having adverse consequences for general
economic stability. If we examine total and core
price inflation over three years, say, most experi-
ence is that the averages are quite close. That is,
food and energy prices display substantial short-
run variability that yields large changes in the
short-run rate of inflation in overall price indices
without affecting longer-run inflation. (See the
charts in Figure 1, which track the CPI and PCE
indices from 1960 through 2005.)
HOW MUCH DIFFERENCE
WOULD A FORMAL INFLATION
TARGET MAKE?
There is a large and growing literature com-
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Figure 1B
PCE and Core PCE 3-Year Moving Averagescountries with their non-inflation-targeting
counterparts, especially the United States. This
literature finds few statistically significant dif-
ferences between countries that have established
inflation targets and those that have not. This
finding has led some analysts to argue, “if it isn’t
broke, don’t fix it.” There are a number of reasons
why such findings are not too surprising: The
benefits from price stability are diffuse and diffi-
cult to measure; the industrialized economies
are highly interconnected, so that some of the
benefits to countries that have inflation targets
spill over to those that do not; the growth rate
effect is small, so it will take a long time before
one can distinguish a statistically significant
growth-rate effect. Finally, many of the countries
that adopted an inflation target had a history of
inflation. Adopting a target was a manifestation
of a societal commitment to bring down and keep
down the rate of inflation.
Given that the United States pursued a suc-
cessful anti-inflation policy after 1979 without a
formal target, and established a high degree of
monetary credibility, there is no reason to expect
to observe measurable effects from adopting a
target now. Nevertheless, I cannot help reflecting
on other cases in which low inflation prevailed
but did not last. Consider U.S. policy errors of
the type that occurred in the mid-to-late 1920s
and in Japan in the late 1980s. In both of these
instances, policymakers failed to respond to defla-
tion. I believe that a formal inflation target would
have focused attention on the policy mistake
leading to deflation and would have increased
public pressure on the central banks to respond
more forcefully.
Similarly, the Fed failed to tighten policy
appropriately in the late 1960s as inflation began
its ascent. In the early 1960s, as today, the Fed
enjoyed a high degree of market confidence and
inflation expectations were low. At that time,
only a small minority of economists thought that
monetary policy was “broken” in any important
way, and thus the case for “fixing it” was minimal.
Would a formal inflation target in 1960 have been
an ironclad guarantee that the Great Inflation
would never have happened? Surely not. Would it
havehelped?Ibelievethattheanswerissurelyyes.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Inflation targeting is an approach to monetary
policy adopted by many countries, in most cases
in the context of a societal effort to address unde-
sirably high inflation. The United States, fortu-
nately, is not dealing with an inflation problem
at this time. The case for adopting an inflation
target is that it should help to avoid inflation in
the future and should increase the effectiveness
of monetary policy in a low-inflation environment.
The increase in policy effectiveness should
arise from two consequences of a formal system
of inflation targeting. The first consequence is that
the market will likely hold inflation expectations
more firmly. The second, and probably more
important, consequence is that the inflation-
targeting framework provides a vehicle, or struc-
ture, within which the FOMC can better explain
its monetary policy actions and the policy risks
it must face. Inflation targeting should increase
accountability not so much by keeping score of
target hits and misses but rather by encouraging
a much deeper understanding of how monetary
policy decisions are made. That understanding
depends on continuing FOMC communications
with the markets and the public and FOMC will-
ingness to listen as well as talk.
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